Philosophy

	Buddhist Non-Self and Reasons for Caring by Mark Siderits Most people agree that we ought to care about the suffering of others-that we have an obligation to alleviate it when we can. What is less clear is what reasons there might be for caring. There are several popular approaches to grounding an obligation for benevolence: an appeal to enlightened self-interest, an appeal to the will of God, an appeal to alleged facts about the human essence. Buddhists agree that there is such an obligation, but reject all these approaches. Instead they claim that the obligation follows from the fact that there is no self. This claim is sometimes represented as the view that once we realize that we lack selves, we will see that we are all connected, and this will cause us to care more about others. But this misrepresents the Buddhist view. It presupposes that we are self-interested, and merely tries to expand the dimensions of the self. Buddhists deny there is a self, so their grounding of benevolence cannot rely on an appeal to self-interest. What they can do is try to explain why we believe persons are naturally self-interested when in fact there is no self. I explore how their explanation of this belief supplies the premises for an argument to the effect that we are rationally obligated to care about others' suffering.
Go to top ___________________ Last Updated: 19-Oct-2006

Buddhist Non-Self and Reasons for Caring
by Mark Siderits

Most people agree that we ought to care about the suffering of others-that we have an obligation to alleviate it when we can. What is less clear is what reasons there might be for caring. There are several popular approaches to grounding an obligation for benevolence: an appeal to enlightened self-interest, an appeal to the will of God, an appeal to alleged facts about the human essence. Buddhists agree that there is such an obligation, but reject all these approaches. Instead they claim that the obligation follows from the fact that there is no self. This claim is sometimes represented as the view that once we realize that we lack selves, we will see that we are all connected, and this will cause us to care more about others. But this misrepresents the Buddhist view. It presupposes that we are self-interested, and merely tries to expand the dimensions of the self. Buddhists deny there is a self, so their grounding of benevolence cannot rely on an appeal to self-interest. What they can do is try to explain why
we believe persons are naturally self-interested when in fact there is no self. I explore how their explanation of this belief supplies the premises for an argument to the effect that we are rationally obligated to care about others' suffering.